Introduction
In the months following the accident at Three Mile Island, various inquiry groups investigated the problems that caused or exascerbated the sequence of events that resulted in the partial core meltdown of Unit 2. A major problem discovered by most investigators was that no one in the TMI control room appeared to be able to assemble and integrate the correct combination of symptoms that would allow an early recognition of the fact that the critical safety functions of the plant had been compromised, that is, that the core was being inadequately cooled. It was recognized that an overview of critical safety functions was necessary. In response to this need, the NRC staff proposed what is now called the "Safety Parameter Display System' or SPDS.
The Accident At Three Mile Island
To return to the events of March 28, 1979 at Three Mile Island, at about 4:00 in the morning a problem with the condensate polishers caused a feedwater pump to trip. This was followed by a turbine trip/reactor trip. The partial loss of heat sink caused the afterheat to raise primary temperature and pressure. The increased pressure caused the power-operated relief valve (the PORV) on the pressurizer to open. Thus far everything had gone as it should. Control rods were in, pressure was coming down; however, the PORV failed to close when pressure returned below the setpoint. The system was depressurizing, the heat sink had been partially lost. Primary inventory continued to relieve from the open PORV. This event went unrecognized for two hours. The operators finally discovered that they had been losing coolant through the PORV but were led to believe that the primary side was "solid" and the core had remained covered throughout the incident. This, of course, was not true. The primary side had reached saturation, much of the coolant covering the core had boiled away, and steam voids and non-condensihle gases were keeping the pressurizer "solid"--giving operators the impression that the reactor vessel was alsn full of coolant. The conditions in the vessel and the core went unrecognized for another fourteen hours. Finally, when the possibility of fuel failure was recognized, high pressure injection was initiated and repressurized operations began. Non-condensible gases were bumped out of the system during the next few days and preparations for depressurization were begun.
The Lessons Learned Task Force Review of TMI Investigations were initiated soon after the accident ocurred. An Thereare many other contributing factors. The operators at TMI did not blatantly disregard important facts. The hardware made it easy for them to disbelieve or disregard information--temperature downstream of the PORV was a traditionally unreliable indication of flow, incore temperatures were off-scale and had to be jury-rigged to get a wider range readout. The method itself was suspect, and the results were inconsistent and very easy to disbelieve. In the face of a myriad of confusing facts, operators responded predictably, ignoring suspect information in favor of traditionally reliable information like pressurizer level .
The Concept is Proposed-NUREG-0585
At this point, the staff felt that they had successfully focussed on the major problem: relevant information about plant status was dispersed, lacked immediacy and reliability, and could not be easily integrated into any meaningful model. The solution, first proposed in NUREG-0585, was to gather together a minimum set of plant parameters that would be descriptive of plant processes. Lacking a commonly acceptable mental model of plant processes, the staff proposed to symbolize plant processes in what was then called a "safety stat vector." The concept was based on the perceived need of the operators to have a simple, integrated, robust measure of plant health that was concisely displayed and easily understood. Such a display would, by design, gather the most important, safety-critical information for the. operator. Vagaries of inappropriate modeling or losses from short-term memory would be minimized. The degree to which the critical safety functions were being satisfied would be immediately and continuously available.
SPDS-An Action Plan Item
In May, 1980, a "plant safety parameter display console" was included as part of the NRC Action Plan, NUREG-0660. Essentially, the concept remained unchanged. However, the description now more clearly implied by the word "console" that the SPDS would be serving an indedpendent function, a function that could not be served by monitoring scattered meters and dials throughout the control room.
The Concept Is Elaborated-NUREG-0696
In February, 1981, a more extensive description of the SPDS concept was published as a section of NUREG-0696, "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities." By this time many owners' groups, industry groups, and vendors were well on the way to specifying design requirements for their own safety parameter display system. Much information had been exchanged prior to the publication of NUREG-0696,and this give-and-take exchange resulted in a much clearer definition of the SPDS concept. Section If a licensee requests a pre-implementation review, the staff desires to complete it in three meetings to accomplish the four steps listed above. NRC staff recommends that licensees and vendors define the contents of each meeting in terms of these steps. Licensees should also propose a schedule for the meetings. The staff will review the proposed schedules, plan its resources for the meetings, and propose schedule modifications if needed. It is anticipated that the bulk of the review will be accomplished at these meetings. The SPDS that are well under way, or completed, and with which the staff is already familiar, will receive consolidated reviews and may not require the three meeting review process.
Post-Implementation Reviews
The installation in the control room of an unreliable, or poorly designed and untested SPDS represents a potential unreviewed safety question. For example: inaccurate data may be misleading to the operator, or an installed system that requires extensive post installation troubleshooting and debugging will degrade ultimate operator confidence (can lead to operators ignoring the system when it is finally operational). Licensees electing postimplementation reviews should conduct V&V programs and human factors engineering programs prior to design, fabrication, and use of the SPDS. These programs will be reviewed by the NRC as part of its post-implementation review.
Licensees should also prepare a written description of the basis on which the variables selected for the SPDS are sufficient for the operator to assess the safety status of the plant. The description will be reviewed by the NRC staff in a design review meeting. The review will also include an audit of the installed system (same as item 4 of the pre-implementation review steps above). Postimplementation reviews will be results oriented, in contrast with pre-implementation reviews which are to be oriented to Where there is sufficient commonality between generic and plant-specific designs and design methodology, plant-specific reviews may be minimal. Simple confirmation of participation in a generically approved design effort may suffice.
3. Plant-unique design features.
Staff review of licensees electing pre-or postimplementation review will be conducted on mutually agreed schedules.
Staff Documentation
The staff will write letters following each meeting between licensee and staff to advise the licensee of positive and negative findings. Negative findings may be resolved in supplementary meetings as mutually agreed upon by licensee and staff. Other than these meeting reports, the staff will not prepare a summary safety evaluation report until completion of its audit of the SPDS after it is installed and operational in the control room.
Review Status
As of October 20, 1982, the NRC has received one request for a pre-implementation review and approval of an SPDS design. At this time the staff has had no request for a post-implementation review. As for the pre-implementation review, the staff reviewed the proposed V&V program and found the basis of the program acceptable for the design and development of an SPDS. As stated earlier in this paper, an important function in the development, fabrication, and installation of an SPDS design is the V&V program. The staff believes that a good V&V program will ensure that a quality SPDS will be implemented. Based on the acceptance of the V&V program the NRC will proceed to set up an interdisciplinary review/audit team from within NRR. The objective of the review team is to audit the conformance of the design to the V&V program and resolve topics within three separate meetings. The following is an example of the type of technical topics that may be discussed during an audit. (c) Audit the design for consistency of the SPDS with emergency procedure.
